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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN GERMANY

**A Report to the United States High Commissioner for Germany
and the Department of State.**

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State Department review completed

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INTRODUCTION

The primary elements of successful psychological warfare are:

1. Clear and ambitious objectives.
2. An offensive spirit.
3. A flexible plan which makes the most effective use of political and economic means, military potential and propaganda.

This report describes some of the principal elements of such a plan directed toward the attainment of our objectives in Germany.

In drawing up this report, these basic assumptions were made:

1. Any plan for Germany must fit into American plans for Europe and the world as a whole.
2. Preparations and planning in Germany should not, however, wait for a broader plan. The broader plan will determine emphasis and timing but will not greatly affect the basic elements of a German plan. Moreover, Germany occupies such a key position that our capabilities in Germany are bound to influence planning on a broader scale.
3. American policy remains dedicated to the frustration of Soviet ambitions without resorting to all-out war.
4. In pursuing its aims, the Soviet government will continue to shrink from a general war. (Even if this assumption is not accepted and the Soviets are believed to be determined on general war, a sound psychological warfare plan will become all the more urgent. Such a plan will have increased our strength by the time war starts and will put us in a better position to wage wartime psychological warfare. Moreover, the inauguration of such a plan now will be no more of a "provocation" to the Soviets than any other firm manifestation of American policy).
5. Close cooperation between U. S. civil and military authorities in Germany and at home is imperative.
6. The build-up of military power in Western Europe will give impetus to a psychological warfare program but the program cannot wait for this build-up. Psychological warfare should help create a position of strength.
7. Aggressive psychological warfare waged with a fixed purpose will advance us toward our objectives.

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This report recommends that one of our underlying aims in Germany for the past few years should now be made a specific psychological warfare objective: To destroy Soviet power in Germany.

The attainment of this objective will require (1) that we prevent the development of a reliable Soviet satellite in the East and an effective Communist Party in the West, (2) that we make the Soviet zone a liability to the Soviets, (3) that we impel the Kremlin to withdraw its forces from the Zone.

In recommending that this become a fixed psychological warfare objective the authors of this report are under no illusions.

In Soviet offensive strategy, East Germany is the springboard for Soviet ambitions in the much more attractive areas to the West. The Soviet army in the East Zone is an instrument of blackmail which the Kremlin would hate to give up. In Soviet defensive strategy, East Germany is an important part of the buffer between the homeland and Western power. Twenty-five of the forty Soviet airdromes in satellite areas are in the East Zone. That zone is also counted upon for a contribution to the war economy of the Soviet Union.

As for tactical considerations, apart from Iran and Finland, the Soviet Union has never withdrawn its forces from occupied territory without first establishing a reliable satellite government.

But granting that the Soviet will to retain its grip is strong, the means which we have at hand to influence that will are indeed considerable. In fact, we have tended in the past to underestimate grossly the means of pressure which we can bring to bear.

Our West German base has 48 million inhabitants to the 18 million of the Soviet zone. Its economic resources are incomparably greater. This West German base exerts a greater attraction on the East Germans than the Soviet zone can ever exert on the Germans of the West.

We have in the higher standard of living of Western Germany a continuing attraction for the Germans of the East and a source of dissatisfaction with their lot.

We have in Berlin an enclave in which the superiority of our system is demonstrated daily to the Germans of the East.

We have in Eastern Germany all the elements of a resistance movement which can be turned into a potent instrument against the occupiers and their henchmen.

We have in the Oder-Neisse line a deep and legitimate national grievance which can be exploited against them.

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We have as a target in the East Zone a precarious economy which is vulnerable to economic warfare measures.

We have as an attraction to the East Germans the ideal of a "Return to Europe."

We have as a psychological warfare target an occupying force which its masters consider so vulnerable to our blandishments that it is kept shut up in barracks.

We have as a further target an administrative machine which is suspicious of everything and which, in turn, is subject to suspicion by its masters at home.

And we have an efficient propaganda instrument which reaches the population far behind our opponents' lines.

Why, then, should we not shed the vestiges of our defensive mentality and combine the powerful means at our disposal in a great psychological warfare offensive which will strengthen our position in peace or in war?

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I. OBJECTIVES

A. The global objectives of American policy have been defined as follows:

- 1. To build up a healthy international community;**
- 2. To discourage further Soviet (and satellite) encroachments;**
- 3. To roll back Soviet power.**

These objectives are to be obtained by means other than all-out war. The nature of the first objective--the creation of a healthy international community--rules out preventive war as a means of containing and turning back Soviet power. What we are aiming to do is to build up situations of strength which will enable us to negotiate with the Soviet government under the most favorable conditions.

B. For two reasons, Germany occupies a key position in U. S. foreign policy.

1. It is our aim to integrate the whole of Germany into Western Europe and thus make Germany a dependable partner in the building of a healthy international community. The attainment of this aim involves getting the Soviet Zone of Germany back into a unified Germany, tied to the West politically, militarily, economically and culturally. Any advance toward the attainment of these aims means frustrating the designs of the Soviet government to unify Germany on its terms by extending its sway over Eastern Germany toward the West.

2. Due to its geographical position Germany is a base of political operations against the Soviet Union and its satellites in Central and Eastern Europe. In pursuing U.S. policy toward Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, as well as in psychological warfare operations against the Soviet Union and advanced contingents of its armed forces, the utilization of Western Germany and Berlin is of vital importance.

C. For psychological warfare purposes, the U. S. policy objectives in Germany may therefore be defined as follows:

- 1. To destroy Soviet power in Germany**
 - (a) to prevent the development of a reliable satellite in the Soviet Zone;**
 - (b) to demoralize Soviet military forces and civilians stationed in the Soviet Zone - with the ultimate aim of getting them out of Germany;**
 - (c) to keep popular support of the Communist Party in Western Germany at a low ebb and to frustrate the success of subversive Communist activities.**

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2. To attain, with German cooperation, the return to Europe of an unified, democratic Germany.

3. To further through our policy in Germany our broader policies toward reducing Soviet power in Central and Eastern Europe.

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The recommendations contained in the following sections are made with these objectives in mind.

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DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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II. THE DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNIST POWER IN THE SOVIET ZONE

Operation Exit -- 1.

A. Background

1. To destroy the power of Communism in the Soviet Zone, United States policy must aim at preventing the organization of any effective German Communist administration so that the Soviet authorities will not dare to turn the zone into a satellite area. At the same time United States policy must aim at making the position of the Soviet occupation forces and civilian authorities untenable.

Reaching these aims or any progress toward them will help attain the general U. S. policy objective of rolling back Soviet power.

2. The authors of this report are under no illusion that it will be easy to achieve these aims.

The offensive and defensive military value of the Soviet Zone to the Soviet Union is so great that the Soviet Government may accept considerable economic losses and deal ruthlessly with political difficulties in the zone as long as it has a hope of preserving the zone as part of the eastern European buffer region and advance base between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. It is possible that the Soviet government will yield to pressure on the Soviet Zone only if it believes that resistance to such pressure will bring on a general war. It is also possible that pressure on the Soviet Zone will be ineffective unless it is part of a more general and more central political attack on the global position of the Soviet Union. Finally, it is possible that the Soviet Union will regard itself strong enough to discontinue its post-war policy of pressing its advances only by means other than general war and of yielding whenever

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the danger of general war arises.

These considerations, however, should not lead us to lower our sights. If no attempt is made to destroy the power of Communism in the Soviet Zone, this power is bound to grow. Less ambitious objectives than the destruction of Soviet power in the Soviet Zone are certain to entail less energetic efforts. Until a concerted effort is made to attain the most desirable objective, nobody can predict with certainty that it will fail.

3. All action to destroy the power of Communism in the Soviet Zone is either direct or indirect action; it either changes the conditions within the Soviet Zone itself, or it makes the Soviet Government ready to negotiate by pressure exerted upon the Soviet Union and its satellites. Indirect as well as direct action is needed to destroy the power of Communism in the Soviet Zone. This report, however, concentrates mainly, though not exclusively, on a program of direct action.

4. Western German participation is needed, particularly in the program of direct action.

West European (French, British, etc.) participation is needed particularly in indirect action. Pressure upon the Soviet Union can also be exerted through the United Nations.

The participation of German resistance in the Soviet Zone in the program is in itself a most important pressure that can be brought to bear upon the Soviet occupation forces and civilian authorities, and upon the German Government in the Soviet Zone.

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5. The program to attain the objective of destroying the power of Communism in the Soviet Zone must be integrated and flexible. Political, military, and economic measures must all be part of a general plan of action.

B. Proposals

1. Economic Warfare

Measures aimed at thwarting Soviet plans of exploiting the Soviet Zone economy require an economic warfare program executed according to a long range plan. This plan must be based upon comprehensive and detailed intelligence on the economic vulnerability of the Soviet Zone economy as a whole, of its various industries and on selected critical items.

The two main vulnerabilities of the Soviet Zone economy are its dependence on imports from Western Europe and its dependence on top executive personnel. In order to achieve optimum results, the U. S. economic warfare plan against the Soviet Zone should be directed at these vulnerabilities by means of trade restrictions, including preclusive buying, and by depriving the Soviet Zone economy of its key personnel.

Inevitably, there are serious difficulties facing the execution of an economic warfare plan, particularly in the field of trade restrictions, because of the reluctance of the exporting nations to accept the economic losses and political risks involved in cutting their exports to the Soviet Zone. Without an integrated optimum plan, the effort to overcome these difficulties will be weaker.

a. Trade Restrictions

The design of a plan on trade restrictions requires knowledge

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and estimates of --

The economic loss suffered by the export countries whose participation is needed;

The possibilities of re-directing West Europe exports to other markets and of the cost of compensating losses that can not be absorbed through the re-direction of trade or preclusive buying;

The dependence of specific industries in the Soviet Zone upon imports from Western Europe;

The economic consequences for the Soviet Union and the Soviet Zone of delaying, restricting, or stopping imports;

The possibilities of Soviet counter-measures against the West;

The possibilities of Soviet or satellite help to the Soviet Zone in order to neutralize the effect of West European trade restrictions;

Administrative and other requirements of enforcing the blockade.

b. Denial of Key Economic Personnel

Every functioning economy is vitally dependent on efficient direction and administration--i.e., on key personnel in top positions who are difficult to replace.

A study should be undertaken of the key personnel in the Soviet Zone economy--e.g., the two or three hundred most vitally needed persons in top positions--and plans should be prepared to turn these persons into defectors. Such plan has clearly an intelligence and an operational part. Its operational part must include the problem of adequate disposal of the defectors after defection and will, in most cases, have to extend to the families of the defectors. The three main categories of persons involved are business managers, engineers, and scientists.

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2. U. S. Political Measures

a. Negotiation with the Soviet Union

After several futile international conferences about the future of Germany it has become U.S. foreign policy not to negotiate with the Soviet Government a settlement including Germany until the United States has fortified its positions of strength. This policy still leaves certain opportunities for seizing the political initiative to the Soviet Government. It can at any time of its choosing propose a conference and exploit, for whatever such exploitation is worth, U.S. refusals to negotiate. U.S. policy is also open to misinterpretations among our friends. It may be misunderstood to mean that the U.S. is either in principle unwilling to negotiate or is not yet strong enough to do so.

In view of this situation, alternative courses of action should not be left unexplored. The U.S. Government could publicly announce, at an auspicious moment, specific aims of U.S. policy toward Germany, on which it is ready to seek Soviet agreement. In accordance with the general plan to attain the objective of destroying the power of Communism in the Soviet Zone, these aims should be of such a nature as to inspire hope and strengthen the will to cooperate among the Germans in both the East and the West.

b. The Oder-Neisse Line

The United States Government has never recognized the Oder-Neisse Line as final. A settlement of this issue has been formally postponed to the conclusion of peace with Germany. The Oder-Neisse Line, like all frontier questions, is of course a matter of supreme interest to the Germans. Bringing the issue again to the foreground of the political scene would be of great international importance.

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It would also be fraught with dangers. Above all, raising the issue without due regard for Polish interests would undoubtedly consolidate Soviet and Polish interests. In addition, arousing German hopes for a "revision" of the Oder-Neisse Line may stimulate irredentism and undercut U.S. policy to link Germany to the West in this and other ways (for example by indirectly arousing German nationalistic demands regarding the Saar.)

These political complications should not lead to neglecting the unique possibilities of mobilizing anti-Communist and anti-Soviet energies in both Germany and Poland, which are inherent in the issue of the Oder-Neisse Line.

i. Minimum action (political containment):

The United States should through appropriate policy statements and public affairs activities remind the Germans in both the East and the West that the issue of the Oder-Neisse Line is unsettled and that the day will come when it will be settled.

ii. More Drastic action (seizing the political initiative):

The U.S. Government should prepare a specific proposal for the immediate settlement of the Oder-Neisse Line, this proposal to be made at the appropriate time, for example, when the Soviet Government is about to conclude peace with the DDR.

iii. Maximum action (political aggression):

A major move to circumvent the danger of consolidating Soviet and Polish interests, and possibly to drive the political attack further East would be to propose the settlement of the Oder-Neisse Line in the

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context of a larger proposal, viz. to reopen, by international negotiation, the question of the frontiers of Eastern Germany and Poland.

iv. Preparatory steps:

Obviously, such extreme political moves involve great risks and can be undertaken only if the military strength to minimize them is commensurate with them. If the obstacles to executing the maximum program are deemed to be too great, preparatory steps toward its execution should not be neglected. For example, it might be possible to strengthen through public discussion and possibly through certain German organizations awareness of the interests, shared by Poles as well as Germans, in permanent peace in Eastern Europe.

c. German Unity

i. Free Elections

The United States stands for free elections and has repeatedly proposed to Soviet authorities that free elections be held in the Soviet Zone as in Western Germany. Although these proposals have not been accepted and since they can not be accepted by the Soviet authorities in the future, they should be repeated in modified form, for example with the suggestion that these elections be supervised by the United Nations.

ii. Encouraging German Studies of German Unity

In order to convince western Germans that the problem of German unity is a major concern of responsible Germans in the western zones, and in order to direct expectations in both western and eastern Germany toward the unification

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of Germany, the Kaiser ministry as well as selected research groups at universities and appropriate discussion groups should be encouraged to engage in studies of the numerous problems which would arise in case of unification.

During the last five years political, economic and social life has developed along widely divergent lines in east and west Germany. In case of unification these differences would necessitate major political, economic and social adjustments in both parts of Germany. Specific studies of the needed adjustments are not of immediate practical value, inasmuch as Germany is divided. If the fact that such studies are under way became widely known, however, e.g., through the encouragement of the German press by HICOG, this would in itself contribute to sustaining the interest among the Germans of the western zones in a united Germany and heighten the morale of Germans opposed to Communism in the eastern zone.

3. U.S. Military Measures

a. Close coordination of military and political measures.

The defenses of Western Europe are being strengthened in order to change the balance of power and to frustrate Soviet aggression. Without prejudice to the overriding military considerations which guide each specific military measure that is being taken, it is possible to maximise the political and morale effects of these measures by appropriate timing, the most enlightened publicity and in other ways. In the past these political opportunities have not always been fully exploited (Recent illustrations: Failure to exploit the reactivation of the 7th Army as a

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symbol of the transformation of the U.S. "occupation forces" to a "defense force"; sending U.S. tanks to Berlin shortly before the elections, thus giving to the Communists the slogan of the "tank elections".)

The political and morale effects upon friend and foe of specific military measures can be maximized only when there is very close cooperation of NICOG and EUCOM in Germany, and between military and civil authorities in the United States. This requirement applies also to the immediately following section of this report.

b. Military Demonstrations

During the past centuries naval powers have used naval demonstrations to enforce their will upon foreign governments. During the twentieth century, the equivalent of such demonstrations applied against a land power like the Soviet Union must be sought in the realm of air power. As long as the ground defenses of Western Europe are relatively weak and since the superiority of U.S. air and atomic power over the Soviet Union is one of the bases of world peace, the deterrent effect of aerial demonstrations should be considered and tested as a means of political warfare. Training flights of the U.S. Strategic Air Command to European bases, news releases about activities at air bases in Western Europe (or planted rumors of such activities), well timed news releases about relocations of tactical aircraft units to specific European areas, - these and other similar moves may become valuable parts of an integrated, aggressive, political warfare program.

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5. German Resistance in the Soviet Zone

a. General Observations

The Communist regime in the Soviet Zone is unpopular and German resistance to it widespread. This resistance takes many forms, but has refrained, for understandable reasons, from violent or severe action. Much of it has been confined to disseminating forbidden news and propaganda and to giving valuable information to the West. It must be borne in mind, however, that even such milder manifestations of opposition require much courage and involve very great risks; nor is it desirable that the resistance deplete its ranks by sacrificial action which will lead to severe reprisals rather than to liberation. Like all resistance movements, the German resistance in the Soviet Zone will be most effective, if its tactical operations stem from a strategic plan, which covers both resistance within and support from outside the zone.

Many west German organizations support the opposition in the Soviet Zone: they help refugees and endangered Soviet zone Germans, gather information with the cooperation of Germans living in the zone and disseminate news and propaganda. This work is in part supported and supplemented by RIAS and other American and British activities and by the Kaiser ministry. At present a large number of Germans in the Soviet zone are still reached through these efforts; numerous contacts between east and west Germany still remain, and conditions for mobilizing an even more active resistance movement in the Soviet zone still exist. But the work done by German groups and organizations, valuable as it is, suffers from certain shortcomings.

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There is lack of coordination and cooperation among the organizations engaged in opposition work, although the efforts to remedy this deficiency should not be overlooked. There is mutual jealousy and distrust. The Kaiser ministry does not enjoy the full confidence of the most militant organizations and is itself not as active in the Soviet zone as appears desirable.

Too much of the work is "tactical" and lacks strategic direction. There is no articulate long-range thinking among Germans; nor is there as yet an American long-range plan in which the objectives of the work for various phases of the operation are clearly stated.

There is no timetable of United States political and military strategy toward eastern European satellites, with which the long range plan of resistance work in the Soviet zone of Germany could be coordinated.

In short, the opportunities which the prevailing conditions in the Soviet zone offer to a planned and purposeful resistance movement are not yet fully exploited. With all its hazards and sacrifices the work in the Soviet zone does little more than maintain a mood of opposition and dissatisfaction with the Soviet occupation forces and the government of the D.D.R.

In considering the future of the Resistance, it must be expected that the Soviet hold on youth in the Soviet zone is bound to increase if the initiative is not seized by the United States and that Soviet efforts to strengthen Germany military power in the Soviet zone are likely to be intensified as time passes.

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b. Planning the Intensification of Resistance

There is an urgent need for long-range planning of a vigorous Resistance in the Soviet zone. The action program of the Resistance must be coordinated with the military, political and economic programs against Communism in the Soviet Zone (and in the Soviet satellite countries of Eastern and Central Europe). The Resistance must become a policy instrument which serves the common interests of the United States and Germany.

Plans should include provision for progressing, under stated conditions, from the present phase of operations, which is predominately information and propaganda work, to phases of resistance proper, which would include the infiltration of selected Soviet zone organizations, such as the Bereitschaften of the Volkspolizei, sabotage, abduction, direct action against selected, highly placed functionaries, etc.

c. Unification of the Resistance

The Resistance needs unified direction in order to be most effective. This does not necessarily mean that its operations need be centralized: there is virtue and safety in multiple illegal channels and networks. There must be only one strategy, however, rather than divided council, on tasks and aims.

The organizational form which such unified command should take is a political question. Evidently, it is desirable to encourage arrangements which maximize the participation of Western German organizations in the Resistance work. There are certain tasks, however, which can be entrusted only to small and secure groups of activists, such activists cannot operate under anything resembling a Council of many different organizations.

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Furthermore, in order to coordinate the work of the Resistance with other economic, political and military measures against Communism in the Soviet Zone, it will be necessary to reserve in fact, if not in law, certain planning and directive powers to U.S. agencies and to provide for effective U.S. liaison with the special activist groups which engage in the most advanced type of Resistance work.

There is no reason to assume that American participation in the Resistance harms its work or prestige. In fact, the reverse appears to be true: American participation is proof of the U.S. intention to unify Germany.

d. Propaganda During the Initial Phase

Intensive subversive work can be undertaken only when conditions warrant it, but resistance movements grow strong through action and become feeble by inaction. It is, therefore, necessary to have a specific action plan for the period preceding stepped-up activities. Above all, hope and courage of the opposition in the Soviet zone must be kept alive, while organizational and other preparatory steps for intensified resistance are being taken. The means of achieving this end include:

- i. Creating the belief in the existence of a unified, strong, growing resistance movement within the Soviet zone, which has a name, is secure and disciplined, acts according to plan and awaits its time.
- ii. Creating and maintaining the belief in the eventual liberation of the Soviet zone from Communist domination. Care should be taken not to encourage expectations in the Soviet zone whether apprehensive or hopeful, of liberation by means of war. In accordance with U.S. foreign policy, every effort should rather be made

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to strengthen the belief that liberation will be possible as a result of the growing strength of the West and increasing Communist weakness in the Soviet zone and elsewhere. By the same token, all difficulties and setbacks of the Soviet Union, in other parts of the world, particularly in European satellite areas should be given wide currency in the Soviet zone.

iv. Creating and maintaining the belief that the interest in such liberation is intense in west Germany and the United States.

v. Creating and maintaining the belief that the will to make sacrifices for the cause of the Resistance is strong. It may be possible to raise the one or the other German victim of Soviet persecution to the level of legendary martyrdom. It would be particularly important to create the popular image of a German martyr who belonged to the youth of the Resistance and whose name became a symbol.

Some of the measures necessary to attain these objectives cannot easily be taken by using overt U. S. facilities, such as RIAS or by all of the German organizations participating in the program. It may, therefore, be necessary to utilize clandestine means, for example, a black radio station purporting to be located somewhere in the Soviet zone and to be operated by the Resistance.

e. Action During the Initial Phase.

A spirit of resistance cannot be evolved and strengthened by propaganda alone, especially in times of peace when this spirit is not nourished by the advance of friendly, liberating, armies.

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If the time for major political moves is not ripe or during the time consumed by the preparation of major political moves and intensified resistance work, other actions can be taken by the Resistance which will contribute to producing conditions of political instability in the Soviet zone.

Measures designed to increase defection, unreliability and loyalty to the West among leading Germans of the Soviet zone must be supplemented by controlled efforts, from time to time, to compromise influential Germans in the Soviet zone whom we cannot hope to win over. Given Soviet distrust of satellite or would-be satellite communists, the opportunities for effective action in this respect appear to be far greater than are the prospects of successful vilification of Western Germans by the Soviets. Persuading the Soviets that German communists in the Soviet zone are unreliable communists may be easier than convincing the Communists that they are bad Germans.

The role of U.S. intelligence in such maneuvers would be crucial, but intelligence cannot be readily used for active political warfare. In carefully considered cases, however, a sacrifice of security may be intentionally made, e.g. by maneuvering classified information into Soviet hands in an effort to compromise a trusted functionary and thus to heighten distrust, confusion and the felling of insecurity among the Soviet authorities.

Consideration should be given also to the feasibility, gains and risks of well controlled instances of direct actions dramatizing the resistance during the initial phase. For example, it may be advisable to abduct or execute the one or the other notorious German Communist who

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is widely hated in the Soviet zone. Such action would, of course, have to be entrusted to a very small and strictly controlled group of activists.

f. The Ideas of the Resistance

In all resistance planning and work care should be taken not to concentrate exclusively on polemics, conspiracy or stunts. The Resistance will not attract sufficiently large numbers of valuable workers and will be unable to strengthen the will to sacrifice, especially among youth, unless it has ideas to fight for.

Peace, Freedom, Unity, Democracy, Prosperity - these are values to which the Soviets as well as the West claim adherence. Fraudulent as the Soviet claims are, their continuous repetition depreciates these values in the minds of skeptics, confuses the naive and adds to the intellectual malaise in Western Europe. We must preserve the true meaning of these words by decisive action, economical profession and aggressive exposure of their counterfeit use. But we cannot rest there.

Other, fresh, ideas must be added to the convictions of the Resistance and its supporters in Western Germany. The following themes are suggested for consideration and development:

- a. The Soviets and the Soviet Germans prepare for "Bruderkrieg" between Germans and Germans. The Resistance in the Soviet Zone works for "Verbrüderung" of East and West Germans.

v. The Soviets

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- b. The Soviets and the Soviet Germans promote German enslavement. The Resistance works for the Liberation of the Soviet from Bolshevism.
- c. The Soviets hate and fear Europe; the Soviet Germans betray not only Germany but also Europe; the Soviet satellites, like the Soviet Zone of Germany, are cut off from Europe. The Resistance in the Soviet Zone and West Germany work for the Return to Europe of the Soviet Zone.

(For a fuller discussion of "Return to Europe" see Section V).

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III. DIRECT ACTION AGAINST SOVIET POWER OPERATION EXIT--2

A. BACKGROUND.

There is little we can do at the moment to move the people within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. But outside those boundaries, in Eastern Germany, Austria, Poland and the other satellites, there are three-quarters of a million Soviet troops and officials who are much more susceptible to external influences.

These Soviet citizens abroad have seen countries which enjoy a much higher standard of living than ever prevailed in the Soviet Union. Many of the Russians have established contacts with foreigners and can be influenced through them. Some of the officers, troops and officials, unlike those at home, have opportunities to desert.

This great mass of Soviet citizens abroad is a primary psychological warfare target which we have largely neglected. Defection, even at the present insignificant rate of a few dozen a year, produces convulsions in the administrative machinery - the desertion of a junior officer, for example, will bring about the disgrace of the other officers in his regiment, the recall of the political officers to Russia and the imposition of fresh restrictions on his unit. Defection, it is therefore clear, touches sensitive nerves going back to the Kremlin, and if it could be brought about on a mass scale would certainly exert an influence on Soviet policy decisions in the occupied areas.

But even on a small scale defection is of great value.

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Defectors give us most valuable intelligence of the Soviet Union

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for military, political and propaganda purposes. Defectors, with their linguistic skills and regional knowledge, can be of continuing help to us in intelligence work, psychological warfare and subversive operations of all kinds.

Valuable as defection is in time of peace, it becomes of more and more value as the danger of war increases. If ever we have to fight the mass armies of the Soviet Union, we shall need the knowledge and skill to bring about desertions on a mass scale and we shall need trained ex-citizens of the Soviet Union to help us in every kind of black and white operation.

Unfortunately, however, in addition to the precautionary measures taken by the Soviet authorities, there are serious obstacles to defection. First of all there is the widespread awareness throughout the Soviet Union that the western powers returned several million Soviet citizens after the war. Even as late as 1948 we were returning defectors, who then were given a public execution. Since then, the few defectors who have come over, like the earlier emigres who escaped repatriation, have had a difficult time. Word of their unhappy experience has travelled back over the grapevine and has undoubtedly discouraged further defection.

Systematic efforts will therefore have to be made to overcome the psychological obstacles to defection which we ourselves have created.

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Soviet forces and officials abroad, however, should be looked upon as a target which includes more than the defector program.

A defector is useful to us; a demoralized officer or official is a handicap to the Soviets. Opportunities of demoralizing the Soviet forces abroad are not being fully exploited.

Moreover, tens of thousands of Soviet emigres now living in Western Germany, the United States, South America, the British Commonwealth and other areas could still be enlisted in various ways to help us in peace or war.

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B. PROPOSALS

1. Favorable action should be taken without delay on the recommendations of the Sponge Group and other organizations working on the defector problem.
2. Urgent steps should be taken to provide decent reception facilities for defectors, to retrain them, to find them homes and jobs and wherever possible to enlist them for future activity against the Soviet Union. Funds and other encouragements should be given to such projects as the Russian Institute at Munich which will provide jobs, a useful field of work and a continuing attraction for Soviet citizens who are tempted to come over.
3. Repeated assurances should be given by high American authorities that defectors will not be returned but will find a secure haven in the West. These assurances should be given the utmost publicity--in Russian and German broadcasts, in broadcasts to the satellite countries, in news releases, and in covert publications.
4. A continuing campaign should be launched through all available channels to spread knowledge of defection as an established and recurrent fact. An exaggerated impression of the extent of defection can be spread with impunity even though the Soviet authorities may be aware of this exaggeration. In this campaign we should make use of the Voice of America broadcasts in Russian, satellite, and German languages; of RIAS, of news and articles supplied to the German, Austrian, Allied and neutral press. Urgent consideration should be given to the inauguration of Russian language broadcasts from Germany and Austria aimed principally at the Soviet forces outside the U.S.S.R. (See paragraph 11, below).

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5. Without further delay, authorization should be given and arrangements made for suitable defectors to broadcast to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Zone.

6. Close cooperation in all phases of the defector program should be established with the British who are moving ahead of us in the encouragement of defection but who frankly admit that our efforts would have much more effect than their own.

7. The Departments of State and Defense should continue their efforts to obtain revision of the security and immigration legislation which hampers the entry of desirable Soviet emigres into the U.S.

8. Overt efforts to increase the flow of defectors should be paralleled by covert efforts, the latter aimed particularly at high officers and officials. Overt media should give all possible support to these covert efforts whenever such support is desired.

9. Operations should be expanded to compromise key Soviet representatives who are not potential defectors.

10. Efforts should be made to magnify the effects of defection and demoralization in the minds of the Soviet leaders. These efforts should include the stepping up of "dangerous thoughts" propaganda to Soviet citizens in the Soviet orbit with the double aim of demoralizing them and giving their leaders the impression that the ideological climate of the area is bad for Soviet citizens.

11. Urgent consideration should be given to the establishment of regular Russian language broadcasts from Germany and Austria aimed at the Soviet forces in the orbit countries. These broadcasts would
foster

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foster the idea that resistance to the Soviet regime does exist. They would try to promote a spirit of resistance (passive at first) among Soviet citizens and increase the anxieties of the regime over the ideological dangers to which its forces abroad are being exposed.

12. Every support should be given to present and future efforts to salvage Soviet emigres and enlist them for intelligence, research, propaganda, and all types of black operations.

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IV. STRENGTHENING THE WEST GERMAN BASE

A. BACKGROUND.

The strength of our base in Western Germany depends on the reliability of the great mass of Germans, the strength or weakness of the Communists and the ties which bind Western Germany to the free world, as well as on purely military factors.

In the past five years much has been done in West Germany to promote the forms and spirit of democracy and to hold the danger of Communism in check.

It must be remembered, however, that though the Communists seem to have lost the power to convert, they still have the power to confuse. They will certainly use this power to the utmost in trying to frustrate our attempt to bring Germany into the European defense program. They may therefore be expected to support, covertly or overtly, everyone in Western Germany who delays the defense effort--Schumacher, Niemöller or any one else who suits their purposes. And the possibility that they will resort to sabotage and all kinds of subversion may be expected to grow stronger.

Time has not permitted the authors of this report to examine closely the economic, political and military factors involved in the program to integrate Germany into Western Europe. For that reason, no proposals are made concerning them.

But though the emphasis in the report is on offensive psychological warfare against the Soviets and their German henchmen, we cannot afford to neglect the basic long-term tasks of making the Germans good democrats and good Europeans.

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B. PROPOSALS.

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B. PROPOSALS.

1. Long-range objectives.

The achievement of long-range policy objectives in Germany depends now, more than ever, on the success of our reorientation program.

If the Germans are again to bear arms, it is essential that the spirit of democracy and of European solidarity should animate the nation.

Therefore, though there may be shifts in emphasis, there is no reason to relax our efforts to achieve the basic objectives which were set at the start of the occupation.

2. Short-range objectives.

But though long-range objectives remain the same, all the persuasive power of the American administration in Germany will have to be exerted from time to time toward short-range objectives whose achievement is essential to our long-term plans.

This has been clearly demonstrated by the flare-up of German opinion over the defense program. Unless we can solve the problem of German and European defense, democracy will have no chance of survival in Germany--or, for that matter, anywhere on the Continent. The achievement of our immediate objective--the participation of Germany in European defense on terms acceptable to us--is therefore a prerequisite to the attainment of our ultimate goals.

As necessity dictates, short-term objectives must be speedily attacked not only by the Office of Public Affairs but by American representatives in all departments and at all levels.

The work which the High Commissioner performs to overcome opposition at the top must be paralleled all down the line into the

Laender by efforts to persuade officials, politicians, editors and reporters, labor

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leaders, industrialists, churchmen, educators and youth leaders.

This requires that means be found to indoctrinate quickly everyone participating in the persuasive effort. Guidance -- whether from Washington, the High Commissioner or PEPSCO -- must flow down the line and get into the hands of everyone who can make use of it.

The Director of the Office of Public Affairs should have a permanent deputy in Bonn to work in close cooperation with the political representative on the day-to-day task of influencing officials, politicians and newspaper editors and correspondents.

3. Labor and the Democratic Left.

The defense problem has also shown the importance of strengthening our relations with certain German political and social groups. In the past our closest political relations have been with parties of the Center and the moderate Right and with social groups other than Labor. Similarly, our economic policy has helped Labor chiefly in an indirect way by creating employment, but we have done little to allay the understandable political apprehension among left-wing democrats that the secular trend in Western Germany and in Europe at large is toward restoring to positions of strength those social and economic groups which are traditionally more interested in social power than in social progress. Our policies have not always reflected an appreciation of the fact that German Social-Democrats, unlike those of France and Italy, command strong popular support and have been the strongest bulwark against Communism.

In order to cope effectively with Social Democratic opposition to German participation in European defense on terms other than those defined by that opposition; in order to further the long range interests in strengthening democracy and, finally, in order to maintain freedom of political

maneuvre, we must recognize and avoid the danger of being too closely identified with the present government of the Federal Republic.

Concrete actions, of course, will help more than mere words. There may be many fields in which we may be able to render genuine and legitimate service to German labor. For example, the existing tax laws apparently favor evasion by the wealthy and put an inequitable burden on labor and the white collar workers whose income is taxed at the source. By using our influence to remedy this situation, we might greatly strengthen our influence with the democratic Left.

We might also use our influence to good effect in promoting the development of an enlightened German capitalism. If there is one thing we Americans know better than anybody else it is how to make the capitalist system work. We could therefore use our influence to good effect in acquainting German industrialists and employers with some of the enlightened practices of American business and thus helping to break down some of the antagonism which exists between employer and employed in Germany.

On the political side, our efforts should not consist of "battering up" Schumacher. We should maintain friendly relations with other -- and younger -- Socialist leaders and give them such encouragement as we can.

4. Checking the Communists.

We should be prepared to deal with an increase of subversive Communist activity in Western Germany. This will entail a rapid increase in the number of Labor Service troops, speeding up the formation of the Federal police force, the provision of adequate weapons for both organizations, the enlistment of the cooperation of labor leaders in the prevention of industrial sabotage.

As long as war does not seem to be imminent, the following principles should be observed in countering Communist activity:

A. Repressive action, such as the prohibition of Communist organizations or the suppression of Communist publications, should be taken only in special cases and avoided as a general rule. The German authorities should not be encouraged to resort to wholesale repression. Repressive measures merely drive Communism into total illegality without necessarily reducing its effectiveness. Moreover, they deprive the democratic governments in the Laender and in Bonn of the impression of strength which tolerance of criticism conveys.

B. When repressive action against Communist organizations, activities or personnel is taken, it should, whenever possible, be balanced by action against extreme rightist efforts as well. American and German authorities should seize these occasions to show that they stand for opposition to totalitarianism of all kinds.

C. Communist propaganda in the West should be countered by positive action, affirmation of the strength and values of the West and by exposure of life in Soviet dominated areas, especially the Soviet zone of Germany, and in the Soviet Union itself. Communist propaganda should, as a rule, not be countered by polemics, with content, form or timing dictated by our opponents.

D. Western vulnerabilities to Communist propaganda, particularly in the field of economic and social policy, should be met not by denial but by remedial measures and the encouragement of sober and honest public discussion. Western Germany progressing toward economic rehabilitation within the economy of Europe should not be shielded from criticism of its social and economic shortcomings.

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V. THE RETURN TO EUROPE

A. BACKGROUND

Throughout this report it has been emphasized that an effective psychological warfare effort in Germany requires not only close coordination of political, economic, military, propaganda and organizational (subversive) measures, but must also be part of a larger plan which deals with the Soviet Union and its European orbit. Furthermore, in Germany itself, psychological warfare directed at Communist power in the Soviet Zone (and in Western Germany) must not undercut our long-range policy of strengthening popular government and the democratic way of life. Finally, U.S. policy toward Germany requires the cooperation of other Western nations, notably France and Great Britain.

The difficulties of meeting these different requirements without sacrifice of principle and loss of purpose are considerable. This is clearly illustrated at present by the issue of West German participation in European defense. The necessary integration is more likely to succeed if it is impelled by broad, unifying ideas.

B. PROPOSALS

1. The Idea

It is suggested that the "Return to Europe" is such a political idea

- a. "Return to Europe" can be held out as hope (and introduced into the U.S. Information Program) to all Soviet

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Satellites in Europe as well as to the Soviet Zones of Occupation in Germany and Austria.

- b. "Return to Europe", addressed to Germans in the Soviet Zone of Germany, is in harmony with U. S. policy toward Western Germany and with the best political thought in Western Germany.
- c. "Return to Europe" (rather than "German Unity ") is likely to be an idea welcome also to those Europeans, in France, West Germany, etc., who are apprehensive of German nationalism and irredentism.
- d. "Return to Europe" appeals to those Europeans who are opposed to "Americanism", much as they may desire and enjoy American economic aid.
- e. "Return to Europe" is a platform which counters Soviet propaganda about "American imperialism " without entering into polemics with this charge.
- f. "Return to Europe" implies that the European countries under Soviet domination are controlled by a non-European power. Without appealing to any nationalism it stresses that the Soviet Union and the satellites are divided by cultural heritage, economic and political interests.
- g. "Return to Europe" cannot be adopted by Soviet propaganda - like Freedom, Democracy, Welfare, Peace, Progress, Unity - for counterfeit purposes.
- h. "Return to Europe" is affirmative and dynamic.

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2. Mechanics

Though what is happening in Germany affects all of Europe, much of our program for Germany is carried out in a vacuum without much relation to our activities in the rest of Europe.

Progress toward our policy objectives in Germany is often delayed by the French; yet we are making no systematic effort to influence French opinion in favor of our German policy. Much of what we do in Germany has a direct application in Austria; yet there is very little coordination even on so vital a matter as the defector program. Any attempt to put the "Return to Europe" idea into motion will require the cooperation of American missions everywhere in Europe, but the machinery for such cooperation does not exist.

These steps should be considered.

- a. A closer relationship than now exists within the Department of State between policy-making and informational activities for Germany and Austria and for the remainder of Europe.
- b. The appointment by the Assistant Secretary for Public Information of a liaison representative with the Office of Public Affairs at HICOG.
- c. The appointment of an information specialist on France to the Office of Public Affairs at HICOG.
- d. The appointment of an information specialist on Germany to the American information staff in Paris.

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- e. The cultivation of French, British and other foreign correspondents in Germany with the aim of influencing opinion in their countries through them.
- f. Arrangements for consultation between those engaged in overt and covert psychological warfare activities in Germany, Austria and the satellite countries.
- g. Greater use of Germany and Austria as bases for informational and psychological warfare activities directed at the satellites.

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